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SIXTH AMENDMENT-DEATH
QUALIFICATION OF THE JURY:
PROCESS IS PERMISSIBLE WHERE
DEFENDANT DOES NOT FACE
DEATH PENALTY
Buchanan v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Buchanan v. Kentucky,' the United States Supreme Court severely limited a criminal defendant's right, under the sixth 2 and the
fourteenth 3 amendments, to trial by an impartial jury. 4 In denying
petitioner Buchanan's claims, 5 the Court found its prior decision in
7
Lockhart v. McCree6 dispositive of the issues presented in Buchanan.
In McCree,8 the Supreme Court addressed the issues it had left unresolved in its earlier decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois9 and held that
"death-qualification" 1 0 of a jury prior to the guilt phase of a bifur1 107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987).
2 The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury... .
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3 The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
4 The sixth amendment has been interpreted as requiring that the jury be drawn
from a fair cross-section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528
(1975).
5 Petitioner Buchanan claimed that his right to a fair and impartial jury drawn from
a fair cross-section of the community was violated when the Commonwealth of Kentucky
was permitted to "death-qualify" the jury in his joint trial with a capital defendant, and
further, Buchanan claimed that his sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel
was infringed when the Commonwealth was permitted to introduce a report concerning
Buchanan's amenability to psychiatric treatment pending trial.
6 Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S.Ct. 1758 (1986).
7 Buchanan, 107 S.Ct. at 2913.
8 McCree, 106 S.Ct. 1758.
9 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
10 "Death-qualification" is the process whereby the state is permitted to exclude
from the jury those veniremen who state that they are unwilling to impose the death
penalty under any circumstances. The excluded veniremen are known as "Witherspoonexcludables." Buchanan, 107 S.Ct. at 2902-10 n.6 (citations omitted).
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cated" capital12 trial did not violate the defendant's right to an impartial jury. 13 Furthermore, the Witherspoon Court held the fair
cross-section requirement 14 applicable to venires 15 only. The Court
stated that even if it were to hold the fair cross-section requirement
applicable to petit juries' 6 as well as to venires, "death-qualification" of the jury would not violate this requirement because those
excluded from the jury through the "death-qualification" process
did not constitute a "distinctive group"' 17 for fair cross-section
purposes.
The final link in the Witherspoon/McCree chain was forged with
the majority holding in Buchanan.'8 The majority held that the sixth
amendment right to an impartial jury trial is not violated where the
state is permitted to "death-qualify" the jury in ajoint trial of a capital and a non-capital defendant.' 9
The majority in Buchanan also severely limited the protection
afforded a criminal defendant through the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. 20 In Estelle v. Smith,2 1 the Court held that
psychiatric testimony concerning the defendant's future dangerousness was inadmissible at the sentencing phase of the defendant's
22
trial where the psychiatrist had conducted a competency exam
I1 A bifurcated trial is the procedure whereby the defendant's guilt is determined in
one proceeding, and, if found guilty, the defendant's sentence is determined in another
proceeding.
12 Capital trials are those situations where the defendant has been charged with a
crime for which one of the possible penalties is death.
13 McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1760.
14 See supra note 4.
15 A venire is the pool from which the jury is drawn. A venire may be compiled in a
variety of ways. Usually, voter registration rolls are used or phone listings are
employed.
16 A petit jury is the group selected from the venire to try the case.
17 McCree, 106 S.Ct. at 1765. The Court noted that the fair cross-section requirement prohibits the systematic exclusion of a "distinctive group" in the community.
Since the Court refused to extend "distinctive group" status to "Witherspoon-excludables," "death-qualification" did not violate the fair cross-section requirement. Id. at
1765-67. See supra note 10 for a discussion of "Witherspoon-excludables."
18 See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
19 Buchanan, 107 S.Ct. at 2916.
20 The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
22 In criminal trials, state statutes often provide for the court or counsel to order
psychiatric exams on the defendant's competency to stand trial. See, e.g., TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.02 (Vernon 1979). At the core of this procedure is the belief that
the state cannot convict one who does not understand the proceedings against him and
cannot, therefore, assume the adversarial position necessary to the American system of
criminal justice.
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only and the defendant did not receive the warnings required by
Miranda v. Arizona 2 3 prior to this examination. While Buchanan was
analogous to the facts of Estelle, the Court refused to reach an analogous result and instead upheld the admission of a report concerning
Buchanan's amenability to pre-trial treatment at the sentencing
24
phase of petitioner Buchanan's trial.
This Note considers the Buchanan opinions and concludes that
the majority decision constitutes an unwarranted expansion of the
state's right to "death-qualify" a jury. This Note argues that the
preeminence afforded the state's interest in a "death-qualified" jury
by the Buchanan Court is achieved only through an infringement
upon the defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury. Furthermore, the Court's reliance on the McCree decision is misplaced as
this reliance is an attempt to achieve similiar results for completely
dissimiliar scenarios. Moreover, this Note examines the Court's reasoning concerning the admissibility of the competency report and
suggests that the decision will have an adverse impact on both the
willingness of the defendant to proffer an insanity defense and the
truthfulness of the defendant during a psychiatric exam. Finally,
this Note considers the future implications of the Buchanan decision
and concludes that Buchanan effectively closes the door to future
challenges to the "death-qualification" process and further, that
Buchanan severely undermines the protection previously afforded to
a criminal defendant through the sixth amendment right to counsel.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF BUCHANAN

On January 7, 1981, the Louisville, Kentucky police found Barbel C. Poore's partially-clad body in the back of her automobile. 2 5
Poore had been sexually assaulted and shot twice in the head. 2 6 After a police investigation, David Buchanan, Kevin Stanford and Troy
Johnson were arrested. 27 According to the confessions of the accused, Buchanan had approached Johnson with the idea of robbing
23 Estelle, 451 U.S. at 461, 468. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires
that a defendant who is in custody and subject to interrogation be given certain warnings. The defendant must be told of his right to remain silent and that if he gives up this
right, anything he says may be used against him. The defendant must also be told of his

right to an attorney and he must be told that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed for him. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
24 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2918.
25 Id. at 2908.
26 Id.

27 Troy Johnson pled guilty to accomplice liability in exchange for testifying against
Buchanan and Stanford at trial. Id. at 2909 n.2. Buchanan, although a juvenile at the
time of the crime, was charged with murder, first-degree robbery, sodomy, and receiving
stolen property. Id. at 2909 n.3.
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the Checker Oil Station where Poore worked. 28 After Buchanan obtained a gun and bullets from Johnson's brother, the three drove to
the gas station. 29 Buchanan and Stanford then entered the station
office. 3 0 While Buchanan attempted to locate and open the station's
safe, Stanford, armed with a gun, took Poore into the station's interior restroom where he raped her.3 1 After Buchanan's attempt to
open the station's safe failed, he joined Stanford and the two "took
turns raping and sodomizing Poore despite her plea to [Buchanan]
that the assault cease." 3 2 Approximately one-half hour later, Stanford drove Poore in her car a short distance from the gas station as
Buchanan and Johnson followed in Johnson's car.3 3 As Buchanan
looked on, Stanford shot Poore in the face.3 4 When Buchanan began to return to Johnson's car, Stanford shot Poore again in the
35
back of the head.
After the indictment of Stanford and Buchanan, 3 6 the Commonwealth of Kentucky elected to prosecute the two defendants in a
joint trial.3 7 Buchanan, while not requesting that his trial be severed
28 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2908.
29 Id.

30 Id. Stanford was carrying the gun. Id.
3'

Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 2908.

34 Id. at 2909.
35 Id.
36 See supra note 27. The relevant Kentucky murder statute provides:

(1) A person is guilty of murder when:
(a) With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such
person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution a person shall not be
guilty under this subsection if he acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's
situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. However,
nothing contained in this section shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for or
preclude a conviction of manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime;
(b) Including, but not limited to, the operation of a motor vehicle under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he wantonly engages in
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person and thereby causes
the death of another person.
(2) Murder is a capital offense.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985).

37 The relevant Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure provided:
Two (2) or more offenses may be charged in the same complaint or two (2) or more
offenses whether felonies or misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the same
indictment or information in a separate count for each offense, if the offenses are of
the same or similar character or are based on the same acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. Rule 6.18 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986).

Two (2) or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment, information or
complaint if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in
the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such
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from Stanford's, filed two pre-trial motions with the court.3 8
Buchanan first moved the court to prevent the Commonwealth of
Kentucky from "death-qualifying" 3 9 the jury at the guilt phase of the
trial. 40 In support of this motion, Buchanan argued that "deathqualification" violated his rights, under the sixth and the fourteenth
amendments, 4 ' to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section
of the community. 4 2 Buchanan also contended that the process of
43
"death-qualifying" a jury through "death-qualification" voir dire
would result in a prosecution-prone jury violative of his right to trial
by a fair and impartial jury. 44 Finally, Buchanan argued that any
state interest in securing ajury free from those unwilling to impose
a punishment if mandated by law could be protected at the punishment phase of the trial. 4 5 The court subsequently denied this motion.4 6 Alternatively, Buchanan's second motion requested that the
court impanel two juries.4 7 Buchanan sought a "non-death-qualified" jury to determine his guilt or innocence and a second "deathqualified" jury to determine penalty in the event the first jury returned a verdict of guilty. 48 The court also denied this motion. 49
defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately, and all of
the defendants need not be charged in each count.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. Rule 6.20 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986).
The court may order two (2) or more indictments, informations, complaints or uniform citations to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if more than
one (1), could have been joined in a single indictment, information, complaint or
uniform citation. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under
a single indictment, information, complaint or uniform citation.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. Rule 9.12 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986). The United States
Supreme Court held these rules applicable to the facts of Buchanan. See Buchanan, 107 S.
Ct. at 2902 n.4.
38 Buchanan, 107 S.Ct. at 2909.
39 See supra note 10, wherein the process of "death-qualification" is explained.
40 Buchanan, 107 S.Ct. at 2909.
41 See supra notes 2 and 3.
42 Motion to Preclude "Death Qualification" ofJury During Voir Dire at Guilt-Innocence Phase of Trial at 5, Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Buchanan, (Jefferson Circuit
Court, 9th Div. 1982) (No. 81-CR-1218). [hereinafter Motion to Preclude "Death
Qualification"].
43 Voir dire literally means to "speak the truth." It refers to the process which may
be undertaken by the court or by counsel wherein the potential juror or witness is questioned as to his competency or his knowledge. See FED. R. Civ. P. 47.
44 Motion to Preclude "Death Qualification" at 5.
45 Id.
46 Buchanan, 107 S.Ct. at 2910.
47 Id. at 2909.
48 Id. See also Motion for SeparateJuries for Guilt-Innocence and Sentencing Phases
with Proviso That in the Selection of Guilt-Innocence Phase Jury No Removal for Cause
be Allowed of Jurors Who are not "Death Qualified" Under Witherspoon v. Illinois,
Buchanan (No.81-CR-1218). [hereinafter Motion for Separate Juries].
49 Buchanan, 107 S.Ct. at 2910.
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Buchanan subsequently filed a third pre-trial motion requesting dismissal of the capital portion of the indictment against him. 50 This
motion was granted. 5 ' At the start of voir dire, 52 Buchanan renewed
his earlier two motions on the "death-qualification" of the jury, both
53
of which were denied.
54
At trial, Buchanan attempted to prove the affirmative defense
of "extreme emotional disturbance." 5 5 Martha Elam, a social
worker assigned to Buchanan when he was in the Commonwealth's
56
custody for unrelated crimes, served as Buchanan's sole witness.
Elam read into the record reports and letters concerning
Buchanan's mental status. 57 Over Buchanan's objections, 58 the
50 Id.

51 Id. Buchanan sought dismissal of the capital portion of the indictment because he
was not the "triggerman" and, therefore, under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982), it was constitutionally impermissible to sentence him to death.
52 See supra note 43 for an explanation of voir dire.
53 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2910.
54 An affirmative defense is raised by the defendant in order to reduce the charge
against him. For example, in Kentucky, if a defendant charged with murder was suffering from extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the crime, the charge of murder
becomes one of manslaughter. See supra note 36 for the applicable Kentucky murder
statute.
55 Extreme emotional disturbance is a defense in Kentucky to the charge of murder.
See supra note 36 for the applicable Kentucky murder statute. Extreme emotional disturbance may be aroused by "'any event, or even words.... .'" Gall v. Commonwealth, 607
S.W.2d 97, 108 (Ky. 1980) (emphasis in original) (quoting Drafters' Commentary to Kentucky Penal Code), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 989 (1981). In Kentucky, the presence of extreme emotional disturbance is determined by an objective test. The test is whether
there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for the extreme emotional disturbance.
Gall, 607 S.W.2d at 108. However, in determining if a reasonable explanation or excuse
for the extreme emotional disturbance was present, the triers of fact must place themselves in the defendant's position as he believed that position to be at the time he acted.
Id. at 108. Thus, the common law test that the provocation be of the type which would
"inflame the passions of the ordinary reasonable man," id., is rejected. See also Wellman
v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1985)(overruling contention that the absence
of extreme emotional disturbance is an element of the crime of murder and must be
proven; and stating that extreme emotional disturbance and mental illness are not synonymous terms).
56 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2910.
57 Id. Elam's testimony involved reports and evaluations made concerning
Buchanan. Elam essentially stated that Buchanan possessed a borderline intelligence
quotient and had the potential for developing a full-blown schizophrenic or psychotic
disorder in the future. The reports went on to note that Buchanan was in need of ongoing extensive mental health intervention. The reports concluded that Buchanan had
extensive rage stemming from an extreme unmet dependency need. Despite these reports, Buchanan was released from State custody only two weeks after a report was issued stating that Buchanan continued to resist treatment and resented his placement in
Kentucky's Danville Youth Development Center. Buchanan was released on October
13, 1980, into the custody of his mother. On November 10, 1980, Buchanan was placed
in the tenth grade despite a fourth grade reading level. By December 4, 1980, Buchanan
had missed six days of school. On January 7, 1981, Barbel C. Poore was brutally raped
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prosecution then had Elam read from a report evaluating
Buchanan's amenability to involuntary hospitalization pending his
trial for Poore's murder. The evaluation was prepared at the re9
quest of both the prosecution and Buchanan's counsel. 5
The jury returned a verdict of guilty against Buchanan on all
counts of the indictment. 60 The same jury61 imposed upon
Buchanan the maximum sentence for each charge. 62 The Supreme
and murdered. On November 5, 1981, David Buchanan was charged with crimes in
connection with this event. See Excerpts from Transcript of Buchanan's Trial at 39-53,
Buchanan (No. 81-CR-1218).
58 Buchanan objected because the report was prepared in order to aid in the determination of whether Buchanan should have been hospitalized and treated while awaiting
trial. The report did not concern Buchanan's mental status at the time of the crimes.
Buchanan also objected because he was not warned that the findings would be used
against him, and this failure to warn violated both his fifth amendment right against selfincrimination and his sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Buchanan, 107
S. Ct. at 2911-12.
59 At the time of Buchanan's trial, counsel could request such an exam pursuant to
statutory authority. The relevant statute provided:
If after their examination the physicians certify that the respondent is a mentally ill
person who presents an immediate danger or an immediate threat of danger to self
or others as a result of mental illness and that he can reasonably benefit from treatment and that hospitalization is the least restrictive alternative mode of treatment
presently available, then such person may be retained in the hospital pending a
hearing and order of the appropriate court, or may be transported to an appropriate hospital for retention.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.070 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1977). This statute has since
been repealed.
60 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2912. See also supra note 27 for a discussion of the charges
Buchanan faced.
61 In felony proceedings in Kentucky, the jury deciding guilt also determines the
punishment within the standards set by the applicable statutes. Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at
2912 n.13. The Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
(I) When the jury returns a verdict of guilty it shall fix the degree of the offense
and the penalty, except where the penalty is fixed by law, in which case it shall be
fixed by the court.
(2) When the defendant enters a plea of guilty, the court may fix the penalty, except in cases involving offenses punishable by death.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. Rule 9.84 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986). The Kentucky sentencing
statutes applicable at the time of Buchanan's offense provided that:
(1) A sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be an indeterminate sentence,
the maximum of which shall be fixed within the limits provided by subsection (2),
and subject to modification by the trial judge pursuant to [Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.070 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986)].
(2) The authorized maximum terms of imprisonment for felonies are:
(a) For a Class A felony, not less than twenty (20) years nor more than life
imprisonment;
(b) For a Class B felony, not less than ten (10) years nor more than twenty (20)
years;
(c) For a Class C felony, not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years;
and
(d) For a Class D felony, not less than one (1) year nor more than (5) years....
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.060 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986).
62 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2912. The jury also ordered that Buchanan serve his
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Court of Kentucky affirmed Buchanan's conviction and sentences. 6 3
The court rejected Buchanan's claims that the process of "deathqualification" deprived him of a jury drawn from a fair cross-section
of the community and that "Witherspoon-excludables" constituted a
distinctive group for fair cross-section purposes. 64 The court also
rejected Buchanan's claim that the introduction of Dr. Lange's report was error because it infringed upon his fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination and his sixth amendment right to
65
counsel.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari6 6 to consider two issues. First, the Court examined whether the State's
"death-qualification" of the jury violated Buchanan's right to an impartial jury representative of a fair cross-section of the community.67
Second, the Court reviewed whether the admission of the psychiatric exam concerning Buchanan's fulfillment of the involuntary hospitalization criteria violated his fifth amendment right against self68
incrimination and his sixth amendment right to counsel.
III.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE WITHERSPOON TEST AND ITS
APPLICATION IN MCCREE

In Witherspoon v. Illinois,69 petitioner William Witherspoon challenged his conviction for murder as well as the jury-fixed penalty of
death.7 0 In order that the prosecution might exclude those potential jurors who "might hesitate to return a verdict inflicting
[death]," 7 1 the court allowed the prosection unlimited challenges
for cause.7 2 Witherspoon challenged the state's right to allow ajury
sentences consecutively. Id. The court accepted the jury's sentencing determination but

ordered that the sentences run concurrently with the life sentence on the murder
charge. Id. The jury imposed a sentence of capital punishment for Stanford on the
murder charge. Id.
63 Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 691 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1985).
64
65
66
67
68
69

Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2912-13.
Id. at 2913.
106 S. Ct. 2245 (1986).
Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2908.
Id.
391 U.S. 510 (1968).
70 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512.
71 Id. at 513 (citations omitted).

72 Id. at 512. The applicable Illinois statute provided: "[in trials for murder it shall
be a cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined, state that he has
conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the same."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 743 (1959). This statute has since been repealed.

A challenge for cause allows counsel to strike a venireman based upon criteria es-
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so constituted to determine his guilt or innocence.7 3 The United
States Supreme Court rejected Witherspoon's statistical data7 4 as
"too tentative and fragmentary 75 to support a conclusion that
those jurors who are unopposed to the imposition of the death penalty also tend to favor the prosecution in determining the guilt of
76
the defendant.
Although the Court refused to overturn Witherspoon's conviction, 77 the Court did reverse Witherspoon's death sentence, 78 holding that, "a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that
imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for
cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death
penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its
infliction." 79 The Court noted that its decision in no way infringed
upon a state's right to put a defendant to death if that defendant was
sentenced to death by a jury from which opponents of the death
penalty were legitimately excluded.8 0 To constitute legitimate exclusion, the Court held that one of two tests must be met. First, the
juror must state that he would automatically vote against imposing
tablished by statute. A peremptory challenge allows counsel to strike a venireman without explanation, e.g., for cause, for no cause, or for any reason.
In Witherspoon, forty-seven veniremen were successfully challenged for cause based
solely on their attitudes toward the death penalty. Those excluded represented almost
one-half of the total venire. Only five of the forty-seven excluded expressly stated that
they would be unable, under any circumstances, to impose a sentence of death. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 514.
73 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516. Witherspoon argued that a jury so selected violated
his right to a fair and impartial jury trial because the prosecution's exclusion process
resulted in a jury biased in favor of conviction. Witherspoon maintained that a juror
who offered no resistance to the death penalty was the type ofjuror who would also "too
readily ignore the presumption of the defendant's innocence, accept the prosecution's
version of the facts, and return a verdict of guilt." Id. at 516-17.
74 In support of his argument that a jury so selected was "prosecution-prone,"
Witherspoon offered several studies. Id. at 517 n.10. In his petition for certiorari,
Witherspoon cited a preliminary, unpublished study which stated that "death-qualification" of the jury resulted in a "prosecution-prone" jury. The study noted further that
"death-qualification" of the jury reduces the defendant's chances of acquital. Id See also
8 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 7-160 (1984) (entire issue is devoted to a discussion of the process of "death-qualification" and its effects on jury composition) for a discussion of later
studies which reaffirm the findings of the studies used in Witherspoon.
75 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517.
76 Id. at 518.
77 Id. The Court stated that Witherspoon had failed to show that the jury was biased
with respect to the guilt determination. Id. at 517.
78 "[ilt is self-evident that, in its role as arbiter of the punishment to be imposed, this
jury fell woefully short of that impartiality to which the petitioner was entitled under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 518 (citations omitted).
79 Id. at 522 (footnote omitted).
80 Id. at 522 n.21.
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the death penalty regardless of what the evidence showed at trial. 8 '
Alternatively, a juror is legitimately excluded if his attitude regarding the death penalty would render him unable to impartially decide
the defendant's guilt.8 2 The majority's opinion in Witherspoon left
undecided the issue of whether a defendant, presenting more persuasive data than that offered by the defendant Witherspoon, could
convince the Court that "death-qualification" of the jury resulted in
a "conviction-prone" jury.
In Lockhart v. McCree,8 3 the Supreme Court considered the issue
it had left unresolved in Witherspoon.84 Defendant McCree submitted
fifteen social science studies in support of his claim that "deathqualification" of the jury produced a conviction-prone jury and
thereby infringed upon his right to a fair and impartial jury. 85 The
Court accepted the validity of the studies and assumed, for the purposes of its opinion, that the studies adequately established that the
"death-qualification" process results in juries which are more conviction-prone than "non-death-qualified" juries.8 6 Nonetheless, the
Court held it constitutionally permissible for the states to "deathqualify" ajury in a capital case. 8 7 Thus, the Court upheld McCree's
sentence of death imposed by a jury which was "death-qualified"
prior to the sentencing phase of his trial.8 8
Buchanan, Witherspoon, and McCree form the triumvirate of
"death-qualification" decisions by the Court. In Buchanan, the
Court resolved the final issue left unaddressed by Witherspoon. The
Buchanan majority held it permissible for a state to "death-qualify" a
jury prior to the sentencing phase of a joint trial even though one
defendant is not charged with a capital offense.8 9
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).

84 "[A] defendant convicted by such a jury [from which all those unable to impose
the death penalty have been excluded] in some future case might still attempt to establish that the jury was less than neutral with respect to guilt." Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520

n.18 (emphasis in original).
85 McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1762. See also the Court's discussion of the studies submitted.

Id. at 1761-64 and accompanying notes.
86 Id. at 1764.
87 Id. The Court refused to hold the process of "death-qualification" violative of the

Constitution. The Court reasoned that since "Witherspoon-excludables" were not a "distinctive group" for fair cross-section purposes, the "death-qualification" process
whereby "Witherspoon-excludables" are struck from the jury does not violate the sixth
amendment's fair cross-section requirement. Id. at 1766.
88 Id. at 1770.
89 See infra notes 90-127 and accompanying text for a discussion of the majority's
holding in Buchanan.
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AND THE

EXTENSION OF MCCREE

Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Buchanan v. Kentucky
concerning the issue of "death-qualification" was joined by five justices. 90 Justice Blackmun initially noted that the Court's earlier decision in Lockhart v. McCree controlled the instant case. 91 In McCree,
the Court held that "death-qualification" of the jury prior to the
guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial was constitutionally permissible. 92 Furthermore, the Court held that this "death-qualification"
did not violate McCree's right, under the sixth and the fourteenth
amendments, to an impartial jury selected from a representative
cross-section of the community. 93 In Buchanan,Justice Blackmun reiterated what McCree had explained: the fair cross-section requirement applies only to venires 94 and not to petit juries. 95
Furthermore, the majority noted that if the fair cross-section requirement were to be held applicable to petit juries, the process of
"death-qualification" would not violate this requirement. 9 6
According to the Court, no violation of the requirement occurs
when a jury is "death-qualified" because "Witherspoon-excludables" 97 do not constitute a "distinctive group" for fair cross-section purposes. 98 Justice Blackmun noted that the reasons cited in
McCree for denying distinctive group status to "Witherspoon-excludables" were no less applicable to the instant case. 99 Justice Blackmun explained that those excluded from Buchanan's jury were not
excluded for reasons, such as race or gender, having no relation to
the ability of those individuals to serve as effective jurors. 10 0 Rather,
Justice Blackmun stated that the Commonwealth of Kentucky had a
legitimate interest in excluding veniremen whose opposition to the
90 Justice Blackmun was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White, Powell, O'Connor and Scalia.
91 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2913.
92 Id. at 2913. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of
McCree.
93 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2913 (citing McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1766, 1770).
94 See supra note 15 for an explanation of the venire.
95 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2913. See supra note 16 for an explanation of the petit jury.
The Court noted that "[a]ccordingly, petit juries do not have to 'reflect the composition
of the community at large.' " Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2913 (quoting McCree, 106 S. Ct. at
1765).
96 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2913.
97 For a discussion of "Witherspoon-excludables", see supra note 10.
98 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2913-14. A "distinctive group" is one whose exclusion
from the jury is impermissible as violative of the fair cross-section requirement. See McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1765.
99 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2914.
100 Id.
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death penalty rendered them unable to apply the law to the facts of
a capital case. 0 1
The majority opinion acknowledged that McCree involved a single trial whereas Buchanan concerned a joint trial in which one defendant did not face capital charges. However, Justice Blackmun
extended the reasoning of McCree to the instant case, asserting that
the state's interest in procuring a jury free of "Witherspoon-excludables" was not lessened because Buchanan was a non-capital defendant.' 0 2 Justice Blackmun stated that the state's interest in
"death-qualifying" the jury was as strong as that in McCree because
"the 'Witherspoon-excludables' would not have been able to assess
properly the appropriateness of imposing the death penalty on
[Buchanan's] codefendant Stanford."' 1 3 Thus, the facts of
Buchanan, according to the majority, did not alter the conclusion of
McCree that "Witherspoon-excludables" do not constitute a "distinctive group" for fair cross-section purposes. 10 4 The majority found
no violation of the sixth amendment's fair cross-section requirement
05
in Buchanan's case.'
The majority also rejected Buchanan's claim that the removal of
"Witherspoon-excludables" violated his sixth amendment right to an
impartial jury. 10 6 Justice Blackmun again relied upon the McCree decision, stating that an impartial jury requires only " 'jurors who will
conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.' ,107 Justice Blackmun reiterated that the impartial jury requirement does not mandate that the individual jurors represent a balancing of
viewpoints.' 0 8 The majority noted that if this balancing of viewpoints were required, it would impose a severe burden upon the
justice system because the trial court would have to ensure " 'that
each [jury] contains the proper number of Democrats and Republicans, young persons and old persons, white-collar executives and
blue-collar laborers, and so on.' "109
In rejecting Buchanan's claim that his right to an impartial jury
was infringed, the majority again cited the state interests in a single
101 Id.
102

Id.

103 Id.
104

Id.

105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. (citing McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1767 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,
423 (1985))).
108 Id.
109 Id. (citing McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1767).
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jury recognized in McCree.1" 0 Justice Blackmun noted that the state
has an interest in a single jury deciding all the issues in a capital
trial."' The majority then distinguished the situation in Witherspoon
where the State " 'crossed the line of neutrality' "11t2 and struck all
veniremen who expressed " 'any scruple about the death penalty.' ,113 The Court invoked two arguments in support of the
state's interest in a single jury. First, Justice Blackmun recognized
that the state has an interest in promoting the efficient administration of the justice system.' 14 The majority noted that this aim can
be achieved by having a single jury determine all the issues of a trial
in which more than one defendant is charged with crimes arising out
of the same event. 1 5 Furthermore, the majority noted that a single
trial in front of a single jury avoids the necessity of both the prosecution and the defense presenting the same evidence at different
trials or in front of different juries." 6 Second, Justice Blackmun
recognized the state's further interest in ensuring that the defendant
benefits at the sentencing phase from any residual doubts which the
jury holds over from the guilt phase of the trial."i 7 Justice Blackmun
noted that the state can confer this benefit on the defendant only by
having a single jury decide both the guilt and the sentence of the
defendant. 18
As further support that Buchanan's right to an impartial jury
was not infringed, the Court cited Buchanan's failure to move the
court for severance of his trial from Stanford's.11 9 From this failure
to move for severance, the majority inferred that Buchanan "made
the tactical decision that he would fare better if he were tried by the
same jury that tried Stanford, the 'triggerman' in Poore's
120
murder."
Finally, the majority noted that the concern of an "'im110 Id. at 2914-15.
111

Id. at 2914.

112

Id. at 2915 (citing McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1767-68 (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at

520)).
113 Id.

(citing McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1767-68 (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520)).
114 Id. at 2915. This argument will be referred to as the efficiency argument.
115 Id.
116

Id.

117 This argument will be referred to as the residual doubt argument. Its premise is
that if the jury is uncertain of the defendant's guilt but does not have sufficient reasonable doubt to acquit, this uncertainty will reflect itself in a lighter penalty than if a jury
which had not sat during the guilt phase of the trial determined the defendant's
sentence.
118 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2915.
119 Id. See also infra notes 217-222 and accompanying text for a discussion of the severance issue.
120 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2915.
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balanced' jury"1 2 1 in the context of a capital sentencing 122 proceeding was absent in Buchanan.123 At the guilt phase of a non-capital
defendant's trial, the jury's discretion "is more channeled than at a
capital-sentencing proceeding . ." -124 Also, the jury's discretion at
the penalty phase is "limited to specific statutory sentences and is
subject to review by the judge."'12 5 Noting that " 'the Constitution
presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the
community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual viewpoints actually represented on the jury. . . , "126 as well as the
significant state interests in a joint trial, the Court held that
127
Buchanan's right to an impartial jury had not been violated.
V.
A.

THE MAJORITY-THE PSYCHIATRIc REPORT

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

The majority rejected Buchanan's claim that the introduction of
Dr. Lange's report violated his fifth amendment right against selfincrimination. 128 In so doing, the majority declined to apply Estelle
v. Smith 129 to the facts of Buchanan. In Estelle, a psychiatrist examined the defendant pursuant to an order issued sua sponte by the
trial court.' 3 0 Defense counsel received neither notification of the
competency exam nor of its scope.' 3 1 Defense counsel had not
placed the defendant's competency in issue, nor had an insanity defense been offered.' 3 2 At the capital sentencing phase of the defendant's trial, the prosecution called the examining psychiatrist as
its sole witness.' 3 3 The doctor testified that the defendant Smith
was a sociopath and could not be rehabilitated through treatment. 3 4 At the time of Smith's trial, the Texas capital sentencing
procedure consisted of three questions posed to the jury.'3 5 If the
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id. at 2916 (quoting McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1769).
Id. (citing McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1769).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1770).

127

Id.
Id. at 2918.

128
129
130

451 U.S. 454 (1981).
Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2917 (citing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 466).
131 Id. (citing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 470-71).
132 Id. (citing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 457-58).
'33 Id. (citing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 459-60).
'34 Id. (citing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 459-60).
135 The questions posed to the jury were:
[W]hether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
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jury answered these questions affirmatively, the judge imposed the
death penalty.1 36 One of the questions posed to the jury under the
Texas procedure concerned the defendant's future dangerousness, 137 and it was this "issue that the psychiatrist in effect addressed."' 13 8 Smith was sentenced to death and appealed.
The United States Supreme Court held that the psychiatric testimony violated Smith's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination 139 as such testimony was based not just on the doctor's
observations of Smith, but also on Smith's detailed statements of
the underlying crime.' 40 Thus, the Court characterized Smith's
statements to the doctor as "testimonial in nature."1 41 The Court
asserted that the doctor went beyond the bounds of testifying as to
Smith's competency and in doing so, the doctor's " 'role changed
and became essentially like that of an agent of the State recounting
unwarned statements made in a postarrest custodial setting.' ",142 In
this setting, the Court held that the failure to warn Smith as required in Miranda14 3 constituted a violation of Smith's fifth amend1 44
ment right against self-incrimination.
In analyzing Buchanan's claim of a fifth amendment violation,
the majority recognized that Estelle was a case of" 'distinct circumstances.' ""45 Furthermore, the majority noted that Estelle did not
prohibit the state from introducing psychiatric evidence to rebut an
insanity defense. 14 6 The majority noted that where, as in Buchanan,
the defendant requests a competency evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, "the prosecution may rebut this presentation with
evidence from the reports of the examination that the defendant redeceased or another would result.. .[;] whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society . . .[; and] whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
Estelle, 451 U.S. at 458 (citing TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (b)(1)-(3) (Vernon
Supp. 1980)).
136 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2917 (citing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 457-58).
137 See supra note 135 for the precise wording of the question posed to the jury.
138 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2917.
'39 Id.
140 Id. (citing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 464 n.9).
141 Id.
142 Id. (quoting Estelle, 451 U.S. at 467).
143 For a discussion of the Miranda warnings, see supra note 23.
144 Buchanan, 107 S.Ct. at 2917.
145 Id. (quoting Estelle, 451 U.S. at 466).
146 Id. "'When a defendant asserts the insanity defense and introduces supporting
psychiatric testimony, his silence may deprive the State of the only effective means it has
of controverting his proof on an issue that he interjected into the case.' " Id. at 2917
(quoting Estelle, 451 U.S. at 465).
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quested." 14 7 The Buchanan Court concluded that the fifth amendment offers no protection against the introduction of such
evidence. 148
The majority distinguished Buchanan from Estelle on its facts,
noting that Buchanan's counsel joined the request for examination
pursuant to the Kentucky statute. 14 9 Furthermore, Buchanan's sole
defense was a claim of extreme emotional disturbance. 150 Moreover, because Buchanan did not testify, the majority noted that "the
Commonwealth could not respond to this defense [of extreme emotional disturbance] unless it presented other psychological evidence."' 15 1 Finally, the majority pointed out that Dr. Lange's report
dealt only with the doctor's observations of Buchanan and did not
describe any of Buchanan's statements regarding the crimes with
which he was charged. 152 As Estelle concerned differing facts than
those presented in Buchanan, the majority determined that Estelle
was not controlling in Buchanan's case. Accordingly, the majority
found no violation of Buchanan's fifth amendment right against self1 53
incrimination.
B.

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

The majority also rejected Buchanan's claim that the introduction of Dr. Lange's report violated his sixth amendment right to the
assistance of counsel.' 5 4 In Estelle, the Court also had found that
Smith's sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated. 155
The Estelle Court had recognized that Smith's counsel was not informed that the examination would include an evaluation of Smith's
dangerousness. Furthermore, since Smith's counsel was uninformed regarding the scope of the exam, Smith was denied an op56
portunity to discuss either the exam or its scope with his counsel.'
Due to this denial, the Estelle Court held that Smith had been denied
57
his right to counsel under the sixth amendment.'
The Buchanan Court noted that, in contrast to Estelle,
147 Id. at 2918.
148 Id. (citations omitted).
149 Id. See also supra note 59 for the precise wording of Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 202A.070.
150 Buchanan, 107 S.Ct. at 2918.
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2918-19. See also supra note 2.
Buchanan, 107 5. Ct. at 2918 (citing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469-71).
Id. (citing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 471).

157 Id.
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Buchanan's counsel had requested Dr. Lange's exam.1 58 The
Buchanan majority noted that it must therefore be assumed that
Buchanan's counsel consulted with Buchanan regarding the
exam. 159 Although Buchanan conceded he requested the exam, he
argued that the Estelle holding was applicable because he was not
told that the exam would be used to undermine his defense of extreme emotional disturbance. 160 The Court responded to this argument by stating that Buchanan "misconceives the nature of the
Sixth Amendment right at issue here. . ... 161 The majority noted
that Buchanan's argument concerned the use of Dr. Lange's report
and not the right of consultation with counsel which the sixth
amendment ensures. 16 2 To consult effectively with a client, counsel
must know both the nature and scope of the exam. The Buchanan
had
Court concluded that since Buchanan's counsel undoubtedly
163
this information, there was no sixth amendment violation.
VI.
A.

THE DIsSENT

"DEATH-QUALIFICATION"

Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dissented on the "death-qualification" issue.' 64 Justice Marshall, acknowledging his previous dissent in McCree, stated that "[tloday's
extension of that holding to permit death qualification in ajoint trial,
where not all the defendants face capital charges, compels me to
dissent again."' 65 Justice Marshall denied that any interest of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky would justify the invasion of
Buchanan's sixth amendment rights which occurred when veniremen were excluded from the jury on the basis of responses to an
issue wholly unrelated to the non-capital charges against
66
Buchanan.1
The dissent rejected both the efficiency and the residual doubt
16 7
arguments advanced by the majority in support of its position.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 2918-19.
162 Id. at 2919.
163 Id.
164 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
165 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis
166 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). See infra

in original).
notes 167-74 and accompanying text for a
discussion ofJustice Marshall's rejection of the state interests in ajoint trial advanced by
the majority opinion. See also supra notes 114 and 117 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the majority's efficiency and residual doubt arguments.
167 Id. at 2920 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also discussion at 2920-22.
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As to efficiency, Justice Marshall noted that the number of capital
trials among state criminal prosecutions is relatively low and that
"even fewer capital defendants are actually subjected to sentencing
proceedings."' 168 In addition, Justice Marshall noted that any additional costs the state would incur by implementing either a separate
jury system or a system in which "death-qualified" jurors would replace "non-death-qualified" jurors at the sentencing phase of the
trial would be "minimal by comparison."'' 6 9 Justice Marshall noted
that the Commonwealth of Kentucky had produced no evidence in
support of its claim that providing separate juries or alternate jurors
at the sentencing phase of trial would impose an administrative burden on the state, 170 adding that "[t]he rarity of joint trials such as
petitioner's belies any claim that the cost of impaneling an extra
jury, or of providing alternate jurors, overrides his interest in being
tried before a jury that is not uncommonly conviction-prone."' 7 1
As to the majority's residual doubt argument, Justice Marshall
reiterated his stance taken in McCree17 2 that the state cannot invoke
the benefit of residual doubt as justification unless it allows the defendant the option of waiving this benefit. 173 Since the option of
waiving this benefit was absent in Buchanan, Justice Marshall asserted that "the Court's suggestion that the joint trial was in petitioner's best interest is untenable. .. .
B.

THE PSYCHIATRIC REPORT

Justice Marshall also dissented from the Court's decision regarding the use of Dr. Lange's report. 175 Justice Marshall chided
the majority for glossing over the difference between a report regarding a defendant's current amenability to involuntary hospitalization and a report regarding the defendant's mental status at the
time of the crimes. 176 Justice Marshall explained that a report com168 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2920 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
169 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
172 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting)(citing McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1781).
173 Id. at 2921 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(citing McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1781)(citation
omitted). In McCree, Justice Marshall noted that "'the residual doubt' justification for
the single jury [is] untenable, unless the capital defendant's option to waive this purported benefit is recognized." Id. at 2920 (Marshall,j., dissenting)(citing McCree, 106 S.
Ct. at 1781-82).
174 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2921 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175 On this issue, Justice Marshall was joined only by Justice Brennan.
176 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2922. Justice Marshall noted that "[t]he Court acknowledges this temporal difference [between the time of the two reports] but misses its importance." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted).
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piled pursuant to the relevant Kentucky statute 77 is designed to aid
the mentally ill who will benefit from hospitalization,17 8 noting that
the exam is "not intended to generate evidence of a defendant's
criminal responsibility, including his mental status at the time of the
alleged offense." 1 79 In order that the statute's aim be given full effect, "the defendant must feel free to request an examination without lingering fears that the content of his discussions with the
examiner, or the examiner's impressions of his current mental status, will be used against him at trial." 18 0
Justice Marshall also noted that there was no proof that either
Buchanan or his attorney knew to what use the state intended to put
Dr. Lange's report when the joint request for examination was
filed.1 8 1 Since Buchanan's request as well as his consultation with
counsel was materially uninformed, Justice Marshall concluded that
Buchanan's fifth and sixth amendment rights were violated by the
18 2
admission of Dr. Lange's report.
VII.
A.

"DEATH-QUALIFICATION"

ANALYSIS

OF THE JURY

The majority in Buchanan18 3 incorrectly determined that the
holding of McCree'1 4 applied to the facts of Buchanan. In McCree, the
Court held it constitutionally permissible for states to "death-qualify" the jury in a capital case.' 8 5 In so doing, the Court held that
"Witherspoon-excludables"'1 6 are not a "distinctive group" for fair
cross-section purposes.' 8 7 In Buchanan, the Court extended the McCree holding to permit the "death-qualification" of ajury prior to the
guilt phase of a joint trial in which one defendant did not face capital charges.' 8 8 The Buchanan Court reiterated the McCree holding
and explained that in capital cases, "Witherspoon-excludables" do not
constitute a "distinctive group" because the exclusion of these po177 See supra note 59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 202A.070.
178 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2923 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179 Id.

180 Id. (footnote omitted).
181 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
182 Id.
183 See supra note 90.
184 For a discussion of the holding in McCree, see supra notes 83-88 and 92-96 and
accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
186 See supra note 10.
187 See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 102-27 for a discussion of the Buchanan holding.
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tentialjurors is directly related to their ability to serve on a jury in a
capital case.' 8 9 "Witherspoon-excludables" are excluded from juries
in capital cases because of their refusal to apply the law to reach a
particular result' 90 if required by the facts as shown at trial. The
Court noted that this exclusion is therefore based directly upon a
characteristic affecting the juror's ability to serve effectively.19 ' The
Court reasoned that the exclusion is not based upon characteristics
of the veniremen, such as membership in a certain race or gender
192
group, wholly unrelated to their ability to serve.
While the majority's summary of the McCree holding is correct,
the extension of this holding to the factual situation of Buchanan is
unwarranted. When the state is permitted, as it was in Buchanan, to
remove "Witherspoon-excludables" from ajury which determines the

guilt or innocence of a non-capital defendant who is not subject to
the death penalty punishment, those excluded constitute a "distinctive group." A "distinctive group," as defined by the McCree Court,
is one which is excluded from the venire based upon reasons wholly
unrelated to the members' ability to serve as effective jurors by applying the law to the facts as they find them. 193 When a defendant
faces charges for which one of the possible penalties is death, a potential juror's ability or inability to impose the death penalty bears
directly upon that venireman's ability to serve as an effective juror.
The state is, therefore, completely justified in excluding such a
venireman when it seeks to impose the death penalty upon a defendant. However, where, as in Buchanan, the defendant is not subject to
capital charges, the death penalty is not part of the law applicable to
his case. Thus, a potential juror's beliefs concerning the death penalty do not affect his ability to apply the law in such a case. If the
potential juror is nonetheless excluded from serving on a case in
which the defendant is not facing capital charges, that juror has
been excluded for reasons wholly unrelated to his ability to serve as
an effective juror and, thus, becomes a member of a "distinctive
group" impermissibly excluded from serving on the jury.
In McCree, the "Witherspoon-excludables" who were not permit-

ted to serve on the jury were excluded from jury service based upon
beliefs they held rendering them unable to serve as effective jurors
Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2914 (citing McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1766).
The result these excluded jurors are reluctant to reach is that of putting the defendant to death.
191 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2914.
192 Id.
193 See McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1765-66.
189

190
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in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant McCree. t9 4
In Buchanan, by contrast, potential jurors were excluded on the basis
of beliefs held on an issue completely unrelated to the charges the
defendant faced.19 5 . Thus, the non-distinctive group which was permissibly excluded from the jury in McCree became, in Buchanan, a
distinctive group whose complete exclusion from the jury should
have been deemed constitutionally impermissible by the Court.
The majority's analogy to McCree is misleading and minimizes
the essential difference between the factual situations of McCree and
Buchanan. In McCree, the defendant faced trial for a capital offense. 196 In contrast, although Buchanan initially faced a capital
charge of murder, t 97 the capital portion of the indictment against
him was dismissed before the trial commenced. 198 Morever, based
solely on the fact that Buchanan was tried jointly with a capital defendant, 99 the state was permitted to engage in a procedure which
would have been constitutionally impermissible had Buchanan been
tried alone. 20 0 When the state was permitted to "death-qualify" the
jury despite the fact that defendant Buchanan could not be put to
death for his crimes, the excluded veniremen became what they had
not been in McCree, namely, a "distinctive group" under a fair crosssection analysis. To justify this procedure, the majority held McCree
to be controlling and refused to recognize that "death-qualification"
of the jury in a trial where the defendant faces capital charges is not
Id.
Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2919 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
196 McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1761. McCree was charged with capital felony murder in
violation of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1501(I)(a) (1977). Id. at 1761.
197 See supra note 27 for an enumeration of the charges facing Buchanan.
198 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
199 The majority made much of the fact that Buchanan did not move for severance
pursuant to the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure. Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2915.
The relevant rule provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the Commonwealth is or will be prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment, information, complaint or
uniform citation or by joinder for trial, the court shall order separate trials of
counts, grant separate trials of defendants or provide whatever other reliefjustice
requires. A motion for such relief must be made before the jury is sworn or, if there
is no jury, before any evidence is received ...
194
195

Ky. RULE CRIM. PRO. § 9.16 (1977).

The majority then arrived at the conclusion that the failure to move for severance
was a "tactical decision that he [Buchanan] would fare better if he were tried by the same
jury that tried Stanford, the 'triggerman' in Poore's murder." Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at
2915.
The majority gives cursory attention to the fact that Stanford had moved the court
for a severance and this motion was denied. There is nothing to suggest that the court's
denial communicated anything more to Buchanan than the court's determination to allow the Commonwealth to proceed with a joint trial. See id. at 2909 n.5.
200 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2922 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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synonymous with "death-qualification" of the jury in a trial where
the defendant faces exclusively non-capital charges. 20 ' Ignoring
these distinctions, the Court superimposed the fact-specific holding
of McCree onto the completely different factual situation of Buchanan.
The majority's analogy of McCree to Buchanan cannot withstand
analysis. The law which the Commonwealth of Kentucky feared
would be thwarted by the inclusion of "non-death-qualified" jurors
on the jury panel was inapplicable to Buchanan. In Buchanan, the
"death-qualification" of the jury excluded a "distinctive group"
from the jury and therefore McCree should not have been deemed
controlling. What in McCree is a permissibly excludable group becomes in Buchanan a "distinctive group" impermissibly excluded
from the venire, thus creating the " 'appearance of unfairness' "202
which McCree lacked.
The Court's refusal to recognize that those veniremen excluded
from Buchanan's jury represent a cognizable and distinctive group
for fair cross-section purposes opens the door to further abuse of a
criminal defendant's rights. 203 It has been shown that the white
male is not the typical "Witherspoon-excludable.' '20 4 Rather, blacks,
women, minorities and young adults are frequently overrepresented
in a group of excluded veniremen. 205 By sanctioning the "deathqualification" process for a non-capital defendant, the Court increases the chances that cognizable groups will be excluded from
the jury. Although the Court denies that "Witherspoon-excludables"
are a "distinctive group," the process of "death-qualification" ex20 6
cludes members of groups the Court has recognized as distinct.
When, as in Buchanan, a defendant does not face capital charges, the
201 Buchanan initially faced the death penalty on the charge of murder along with his
co-defendant Stanford. However, because the state could not have sought the death
penalty against Buchanan under the holding of Enmund v. Florida, see supra note 51 for
a discussion of Enmund, the state should not have been permitted to engage in the same
procedure of "death-qualification" which it had previously been permitted to employ
only in the case of a capital defendant.
202 Buchanan, 107 S.Ct. at 2914 (quoting McCree, 106 S.Ct. at 1766).
203 The majority's decision fails to recognize that the concept of a "distinctive group"
is nebulous and must be redefined and refined in each case in which a violation of the
fair cross-section requirement is alleged. That the "distinctive group" concept defies
standard definition is evidenced by how categories of individuals have not been recognized as having "distinctive group" status at one point in time only to be accorded this
"distinctive group" status at a later point in time. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975) (women); Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986) (blacks).
204 For an excellent discussion of the effects of "death-qualification" on jury composition, see generally studies and conclusions found in 8 LAw AND HuM. BEHAV., 7-160 (1984).
205 Id.
206 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (women); Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.
Ct. 1712 (1986) (blacks).
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sanctioning of the exclusion of these groups from the jury cannot be
condoned.
The majority's efficiency argument, which accorded almost talismanic importance to the state's interest in ajoint trial, 20 7 fell short
of justifying the infringement of Buchanan's sixth amendment right
to an impartial jury. Buchanan's right to an impartial jury should
not have been sacrificed on the altar of state efficiency. In support
of its position, the majority offered no interest of the Commonwealth of Kentucky of such importance as to justify the imposition
upon the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury which
Buchanan represents. As Justice Marshall correctly noted in his dissent, "the Commonwealth's asserted interest in efficiency is even
more attenuated [here] than it was in McCree." 20 8 Although the majority cited the burden which would attach to the state if forced to
present the same evidence to different juries, the dissent questioned
what proof the Commonwealth had submitted to substantiate this
claim. 20 9 If the Commonwealth's burden in providing separate trials is truly as great as the majority contends, there is no explanation
for Kentucky's own statute which provides for the impaneling of
separate juries in the case of persistent felony offenders
21
("PFOs"). 2 10 If the state had no provisions for separate trials, 1 its
claim that burdensome costs prohibit the provision of such services
would be accorded some legitimacy. But where, as with Kentucky,
the state provides for separate juries in certain instances, the state
207 See Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2915-16. In support of this argument, the Court first
cites the state's interest in promoting both reliable and consistent results for each defendant. This interest is achieved by presenting all the relevant evidence against each
defendant charged with crimes arising out of the same event at a single trial. Id. at 2915.
As further support, the Court next cites the state's interest in avoiding repetitive presentation of identical evidence at separate proceedings for defendants charged with crimes
arising out of the same event. Id.
208 Id. at 2920 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
209 "[The state] can only presume the magnitude of this burden." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
210 See id. at 2920 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Kentucky's "PFO" statute provides in
pertinent part:
(1) When a defendant is charged with being a persistent felony offender, the determination of whether or not he is such an offender and the punishment to be
imposed pursuant to subsection (6) of this section shall be determined in a separate
proceeding from that proceeding which resulted in his last conviction. Such proceeding shall be conducted before the court sitting with the jury that found the
defendant guilty of his most recent offense unless the court for good cause discharges that jury and impanels a new jury for that purpose. . ..
Ky. REv. STAT. § 532.080(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1977).
211 This is not the case here, as Kentucky provides for separate juries in the case of
"PFOs" and also in cases in which severance has been granted.
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cannot be heard to argue that it cannot afford a procedure provided
for by its own laws.
In opposition to the argument that the Commonwealth's claim
of undue burden is superfluous, it might be argued that the sheer
number of capital and non-capital defendants tried jointly prevents
the implementation of a separate jury system similiar to that in place
for "PFOs." However, this argument fails. First, as Justice Marshall
noted in McCree21 2 and reiterated in Buchanan,2 13 capital cases "constitute a relatively small number of criminal trials. '2 14 Furthermore,
if a system of separate juries were in place for the guilt and punishment phases of capital trials there is no evidence that the number of
defendants who would request that such a system be used in their
cases would overwhelm the state's resources to such an extent as to
constitute an undue burden on the state.2 1 5 Finally, a system of separate juries for the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial is
not the only way to solve the efficiency problem facing the states.
Other alternatives are available to a state at minimal co-st which
would not extract a disproportionate cost from the defendant in the
21 6
form of his right to a fair and impartial jury trial.
Furthermore, the majority's residual doubt argument is speculative and unsupported.2 1 7 The majority points to Buchanan's failure to move to sever his case from Stanford's to show not only that
"death-qualification" of the jury did not prejudice Buchanan's right
to an impartial jury but also as proof that Buchanan decided it
2 18
would be to his advantage to be tried alongside Stanford.
212 McCree, 106 S.Ct. at 1781 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Winick, ProsecutorialPeremptory ChallengePractices in CapitalCases: An Empirical Study and A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 81
MICH. L. REV. 1, 57 (1982)). [hereinafter Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge
Practices].
213 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2920 (Marshall, J, dissenting).
214 McCree, 106 S.Ct. at 1781 (MarshallJ., dissenting) (citing Winick, ProsecutorialPeremptory Challenge Practices, 81 MICH. L. REV. at 57).
215 The number of defendants who would take advantage of such a system were it in
place has never been empirically determined in Kentucky or in other states.
216 Among the possible alternatives a state could implement are: adding another
layer of state courts to deal solely with capital offenses, or adopting procedural regulations which allow the judge to fix the penalty for each individual defendant after a "nondeath-qualified" jury has determined the respective guilt of each defendant. A possible
objection to the second alternative is that it would deprive the defendant of his right to
have a jury of his peers determine the penalty he will face. However, this argument
ignores the reality of ajudicial system in which judges alterjury-imposed penalties quite
frequently. Thesejudicial alterations take one of two forms. First, thejudge may reduce
a defendant's jury-set penalty in a criminal case. Alternatively, the judge may reduce a
plaintiff's jury-set damage award in a civil case.
217 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2921 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
218 See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text for a discussion of the severance
issue.
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Residual doubt, however, is often cited as a benefit accruing to the
defendant from the state's use of a single jury to determine both
guilt and punishment. 2 19 Any doubts the jury may have had regarding the defendant's guilt are said to transfer to the defendant at the
sentencing phase of the defendant's trial.2 20 It is argued that this
transference results in a lesser penalty for the defendant than he
would have received had his guilt and sentencing been determined
by separate juries. 22 ' It is questionable whether Buchanan in fact
benefited from the jury's residual doubt. As Buchanan was not subject to the death penalty, the most severe sanction available to the
jury lay in imposing upon Buchanan the maximum sentence of imprisonment for each offense. Buchanan received the maximum sentence possible, and the jury took the additional step of
recommending that the terms run consecutively. 2 22 Buchanan's
sentence is eloquent testimony that no residual doubt on the issue
of Buchanan's culpability was created in the minds of the jurors by
his joint trial with Stanford.
The majority's reasoning also represents a misapplication of the
residual doubt argument. The residual doubt argument is most frequently used to justify the state's use of a single jury to determine
both the guilt and the punishment of a capital defendant. In
Buchanan, however, the majority used the argument to support the
Commonwealth's joint trial of a capital and a non-capital defendant
by a "death-qualified" jury. The issue of a single jury determining
both the guilt and the sentence of a defendant and the issue of a
joint trial are distinct issues; while the residual doubt argument may
2 23
be applicable in the first instance, it is inapplicable in the second.
Even if Buchanan had benefited from the jury's residual doubt,
this does not justify a single "death-qualified" jury. As the dissent
accurately noted, the Court cannot invoke the benefit of residual
doubt to the defendant as justification for a single jury determination of guilt and punishment unless the defendant is also given the
option of waiving this benefit. 2 24 Furthermore, studies of the
"death-qualification" process show that "death-qualified" juries are
more prone to convict and less likely to entertain doubts as to the
defendant's guilt.2 25 There is, therefore, arguably no residual doubt
219 McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1768-69.
220 Id.

at 1769.

221 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2921 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
222 See supra note 62.
223 See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
224 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2920 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also McCree, 106 S. Ct.
at 1781 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
225 See supra notes 74 and 204.
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on "death-qualified" juries from which the defendant could benefit.
Finally, the residual doubt argument has a fatally flawed premise.
This premise is that the defendant will be able to successfully argue
to the jury which convicted him of the crimes for which he was
charged that his innocence is a mitigating factor to be considered
during their penalty deliberations. 2 26 The majority's invocation of
the residual doubt argument is "more than disingenuous. It is
cruel."

2 27

The majority's resolution of the "death-qualification" issue
presented by Buchanan will likely end further challenges to the
"death-qualification" process. By allowing states to wield the tool
of "death-qualification" voir dire, previously used in capital cases
only, against non-capital defendants who are tried alongside capital
defendants, the Court severely erodes a criminal defendant's right
to a fair and impartial trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. The state is now free to do what it could not before, namely,
"death-qualify" the jury when the defendant is not subject to the
death penalty. The potential for abuse exists. The state will jointly
try defendants it would not have before solely to secure a "deathqualified" jury. In addition to permitting the "death-qualification"
process to prejudicially impact upon a non-capital defendant's case,
the Court's decision allows for the admission of previously inadmissible evidence at the non-capital defendant's joint trial. Evidence
pertaining to the capital co-defendant's conduct will be admissible
as relevant to the issues confronting the jury in the joint trial. This
evidence, which would not have been admissible had the non-capital
defendant been tried alone, may further prejudice the jury against
the non-capital defendant. Thus, the United States Supreme Court
has approved of the state jointly trying defendants who face different penalties by ajury which the Court itself has recognized as more
"conviction-prone." 228
B.

THE PSYCHIATRIC REPORT

The disputed report of Dr. Lange concerned Buchanan's fulfillment of the statutory criteria for involuntary hospitalization and
treatment pending trial. 22 9 The report did not concern the defendant's mental status at the time of the crimes 230 and should not have
226 McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1781 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
227 Id. at 1782 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
228 Id. at 1764.
229 The report was requested pursuant to statutory authority. Seesupra note 59 for the

applicable statute.
230 Indeed, Buchanan's report dealt solely with the issue of the defendant's mental
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been used as rebuttal evidence to Buchanan's claim of extreme emotional disturbance. Buchanan offered Elam's testimony as proof
that he was suffering from a mental disturbance on the night Poore
was killed. 23 1 Elam's report showed that Buchanan was disturbed
prior to the crime and that he received no treatment for this disturbance. 2 32 The jury could have inferred from this testimony that his
mental condition had not changed from the time of the report to the
time of the crimes and that the absence of treatment had exacerbated his condition. The Commonwealth's introduction of a report
based on an examination of Buchanan seven months after the commission of the crimes effectively destroyed any inference the jury
might have made concerning Buchanan's mental condition on the
night the crimes were committed.
Buchanan introduced Elam's testimony in support of his claim
of extreme emotional disturbance. 2 3 3 The reports and evaluations
which were the subject of Elam's testimony tended to establish
Buchanan's need for treatment. 23 4 In rebuttal, the prosecution offered a report concerning Buchanan's eligibility for involuntary hospitalization which was prepared seven months after the commission
of the crimes for which Buchanan was charged. 2 35 The later report
was based upon a one hour interview and focused on the "here and
now."236

It was improper for the Court to uphold the use of Dr. Lange's
report in rebuttal. The majority's claim that Buchanan opened the
door to the use of Dr. Lange's report br offering psychiatric reports
in support of his defense of extreme emotional disturbance 2 37 was
incorrect. Buchanan did open a door by offering Elam's testimony.
But the door opened was to the prosecution's use of rebuttal evidence regarding his mental status at the time of the commission of
the crime and not to the use of evidence on whether he should receive involuntary hospitalization and treatment pending trial. The
prosecution's substitution of one type of psychiatric inquiry for another should not have been condoned by the Court.
status prior to and up until the time of the crimes. Its introduction was for the limited
purpose of establishing that Buchanan suffered from extreme emotional disturbance at
the time of the crimes. This disturbance would have been sufficient to reduce the murder charge against Buchanan to a charge of manslaughter.
231 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
232 See supra note 57 for a summary of the report's findings.
233 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the introduction of
the report.
234 Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2922 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
235 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
236 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
237 Id. at 2918.
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The examination "was not intended to generate evidence of a
defendant's criminal responsibility.
...
2"a Rather, as the dissent
noted:
The examination takes its meaning instead from humanitarian and
therapeutic concerns unrelated to the prosecution of criminal defendants, concerns that may be fully served only by the unimpeded establishment of relations of trust and cooperation among the physician,
the Commonwealth, and the potential patient. These concerns apply
with full force to the mentally ill criminal defendant, and in this context require
the trust and cooperation of the defendant's attorney as
23 9
well.
By upholding the admission of Dr. Lange's report, the majority
severely impinges upon a defendant's fifth amendment right to be
free from self-incrimination 240 and his sixth amendment right to the
assistance of counsel. 2 4 1 The majority has curtailed both a defendant's willingness to request an examination and his willingness to be
entirely truthful with the examiner. 24 2 Anything the defendant tells
the examiner during the exam may be used against him at a later
trial, regardless of the lack of the warnings and waivers Miranda243
has deemed necessary. Furthermore, because defendant's counsel
need not be warned of the detrimental use to which such a report
will be put later, the defendant is denied effective assistance of
counsel, a right previously ensured to the defendant by the sixth
amendment.
The end result of the majority's decision concerning the report's admissibility will be two-fold. First, those in need of a psychiatric exam in order to determine the best possible course of
treatment will be reluctant to request or submit to such an exam.
Most of those in need of such an exam will refuse the exam altogether due to the lack of certainty over how the results will be used.
Second, the trust necessary to an effective doctor-patient relationship will become difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. The patient
will never know how the doctor may employ the results of the exam
in the future. Similarly, the doctor will be inclined to question the
patient's truthfulness since the Buchanan Court has given the patient
an incentive to lie.
Id. at 2923 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
240 See supra note 20.
241 See supra note 2.
242 The defendant now knows that if he confesses to either the crimes for which he is
charged or to a desire to receive professional psychiatric help, there is a strong likelihood that this confession will be introduced at trial.
243 See supra note 23 for a discussion of the required Miranda warnings.
238
239
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CONCLUSION

The line of "death-qualification" cases began with judicial recognition of the constitutionality of the "death-qualification" process. 244 It proceeded with judicial permission to conduct this
24 5 It
process prior to the guilt phase of a criminal defendant's trial.
ended with the judicial pronouncement that a jury determining a
non-capital defendant's guilt and punishment could nonetheless be
"death-qualified" if the defendant was tried jointly alongside a capital defendant. 2 4 6 Thus, Buchanan may be viewed as a closing of the
"death-qualification" circle.
The Buchanan Court's rationale is founded upon a recognition
of the state's legitimate interest in proceeding with a joint trial when
two criminal defendants face charges arising out of the same event.
However, the Court's rationale ignores the more compelling state
interest in guaranteeing that every criminal defendant be tried by an
impartial jury capable of analyzing the defendant's guilt or innocence objectively. 24 7 The state not only has an interest in protecting
the constitutional right of the defendant to an impartial jury trial, it
is also under an affirmative obligation to provide the defendant with
this right. 24 8 Buchanan releases the state from this obligation and
eviscerates the sixth amendment right of a non-capital defendant
tried jointly with a capital defendant to a fair and impartial jury.
The Buchanan Court provides a weak analogy between the facts of
Buchanan and those of McCree to justify the exclusion of a "distinctive group" from defendant Buchanan's jury. In its eagerness to
grant the state an unwise amount of discretion in the conduct of
joint trials, the Buchanan Court ignores the constitutional mandate
of the sixth amendent and opens the door to further abuse of a
249
criminal defendant's rights.
The Court's decision allowing the use of Buchanan's hospitali244 See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). See also supra notes 69-82 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Witherspoon.
245 See McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). See also supra notes 83-88 and accompanying
text for a discussion of McCree.
246 See Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987). See also supra notes 89-127 and accompanying text for a discussion of the majority's holding in Buchanan.
247 See supra note 2.
248 The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution imposes upon the
states the affirmative duty to ensure its residents many of the rights which the Constitution grants to all citizens. See supra note 3.
249 As the Buchanan dissent noted: "[the majority's decision represents the Court's]
'unseemly eagerness to recognize the strength of the State's interest in efficient law enforcement and to make expedient sacrifices of the constitutional rights of the criminal
defendant to such interests.'" Buchanan, 107 S. Ct. at 2922 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 462-463 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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zation report to rebut the defendant's offer of psychiatric evidence
further erodes the criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights.
The decision will have a chilling effect upon a criminal defendant's
willingness to undergo evaluative treatments. State statutes providing for medical evaluation of individuals held in state custody aim to
procure appropriate medical care for those awaiting trial or similiar
judicial dispositions of their cases. The statutes are not designed to
provide the state with a means of gathering incriminating evidence
against a defendant to be used against that defendant in a criminal
prosecution. The Court's decision is a thinly veiled attempt to sacrifice the legitimate state interest in providing appropriate and necessary medical attention to individuals in its custody in the name of
the illegitimate state interest of gathering further evidence of a defendant's culpability without adhering to the Miranda warnings.
BARBARA J. WHISLER

